The Chroma Group, Ltd.
Transnational Conflict Prevention and Interdiction Programmes
Transnational Conflict Prevention and Interdiction Programmes
Espionage by the Numbers:
|
| The following information about the espionage activity is known from open sources. Data on a number of significant variables are available for most of the cases. |
|
Recruitment: Sixty-four percent of the spies took the initiative in volunteering their services to a foreign intelligence service. Fifteen percent were recruited by a friend or family member, most of whom had themselves volunteered, while only 22% were recruited on the initiative of a foreign intelligence service. These percentages differ for different groups. For example, 71% of all military offenders were volunteers, versus 57% for civilians. Seven of the 12 women spies were recruited by a spouse or boyfriend. Information is available for 148 cases.
Motivation: Information on motivation is broken down by categories commonly used when describing espionage offenders, although it is always difficult to know what was really going on in a person’s head. One individual may have more than one motivation, so the following percentages do not add up to 100%.
Money (either need or greed) was a motivating factor in 69% of the cases, and it was apparently the sole motive in 56%. Disgruntlement or revenge toward employer or some other person or situation was a motive in 27%, and ideology a motive in 22%. Ideology includes beliefs and sympathies resulting from cultural affinity (common ethnic or national background). A desire to please a friend or family member was a motivating factor in 17% of cases, many of them cases in which the spy was recruited by the friend or family member. Twelve percent were attracted by what they perceived as the thrills or excitement of becoming a spy, while 4% were drawn by a compelling need to be recognized and feel important. Only 5% were coerced. Thrills or excitement and need for recognition were, in most cases, supporting rather than primary motivations. Information is available for all 150 cases.
Unsuccessful Spies: Thirty-nine offenders (26% of all those who attempted to commit espionage) were unsuccessful. They were arrested before they succeeded in passing classified information to a foreign country. Of the 39 would-be spies who were caught before they could do any damage, 69% were military personnel, mainly young, unmarried, enlisted personnel with no more than a high school education. All were native-born American citizens motivated mainly by the simple idea that selling secrets would be an easy way to get some money. Interestingly, over 60% of the military personnel in this category were in the Navy.
Length of Espionage: Of the 111 spies who succeeded in passing information to a foreign country, 27% were caught in less than one year. Forty-four percent lasted more than one year but less than five, while 29% remained undetected for five years or more.
Security Clearance when Espionage Began: Fifteen percent of the spies held a Top Secret SCI clearance at the time they began committing espionage. Top Secret clearances were held by 35%, Secret by 21%, and Confidential by 3%. Twenty-six percent held no clearance at all. Those with no clearance include accomplices, witting spouses, those who provided classified information obtained during a previous job when they did have a clearance, and those who provided sensitive but unclassified information. Information is available for 141 cases.
Where Espionage Began: Sixty-six percent of espionage cases began in the United States, with a large majority of those on the East Coast. Of the 34% that began outside the United States, 66% began in Western Europe (mainly West Germany) and 20% in Asia or Southeast Asia. Information is available for 146 cases.
Country Receiving Information: During the Cold War, most espionage was conducted by the Soviet Union and associated Communist countries in Eastern Europe. The surprising thing is how many other neutral or allied countries have also been involved in espionage against the United States. American citizens have been arrested for conducting espionage on behalf of South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Israel, Netherlands, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Ghana, Liberia, South Africa, El Salvador and Ecuador. Information is based on the 111 cases in which offenders succeeded in passing information.
Espionage
Target: Information
from the following organizations was compromised, or, in the case of
unsuccessful espionage attempts, was intended to be compromised. The
number after each organization is the number of offenders who targeted
that organization. Navy, 38; Army, 32; Air Force, 22; CIA, 16; Defense
contractors, 15; NSA, 7; State, 7; FBI, 4; Marines, 4; DoD civilians, 4;
DIA, 2; INS, 1. Six offenders compromised materials from more than one
agency and are, therefore counted twice. Information is available for 146
cases.
Payment
Received:
Although money tops the list of motivations for espionage, it is
interesting to see how few spies received significant payments. Most
foreign intelligence services are mistrustful of volunteers and are tight
with their money, except in the most important cases. Most spies received
relatively little, despite the high risk of getting caught and the
monumental cost of espionage to the nation. Of the 111 cases in which
spies succeeded in passing information to a foreign intelligence service,
information on payments is available for 92 cases. Sixty-four of those
receive some monetary payment, while 28 are believed to have received no
monetary payments. Offenders who received no monetary payment include
those who provided information after defecting to the other side, women
who helped their husband or boyfriend, some who appeared to have been
motivated only by a desire to help the other country, and others who
sought some non-monetary quid pro quo such as help for a local business,
post-retirement employment in the country that received the information,
or release of a spouse from prison. Of the 64
spies known to have received cash payments, 11% received less than $1,000;
17% received $1,000 to $9,999; 26% received $10,000 to $99,999; 12%
received $100,000 to $999,999; while 4% received $1,000,000 or more. It is
noteworthy that some of these payments were made as long as 50 years ago, and
that the payment figures have not been adjusted for changes in the value
of the dollar over the years. They also represent only the amount that the
spy is known to have received. After their arrest, spies often try to
minimize the amount of money they received in an effort to minimize their
crime. Length
of Sentence: The
percentages for each initial sentence length are as follows:18% less than
5 years; 20% 5 to 9.9 years; 18% 10 to 19.9 years; 10% 20 to 29.9 years;
7% 30 to 30.9 years; 2% 40 years; 12% life in prison. Sentencing
information is available for 127 cases. Twenty cases are known to have had
other outcomes such as defection, suicide, or immunity from prosecution. Date
Arrested or Exposed:
Five spies were arrested or otherwise publicly exposed during the decade
of the 1950s. This increased to 13 in the 1960s and 13 in the 1970s.
Arrests and other public exposures mushroomed to 56 in the 1980s and
remained at a high level, with 29, in the 1990s. Information is available
for all 150 cases. Large
variations in the number of arrests from one time period to another may be
determined more by the nature of the counterintelligence sources and tools
that are available during a given period than by changes in the prevalence
of espionage. The 1980s have been called the Decade of the Spy because of
the number of successful spies exposed during that period. However, it was
also the decade of the unsuccessful
spy. Many young, unmarried military enlisted personnel were caught before
they succeeded in selling any secrets. Of the high number of cases in the
1990s, many were successful spies exposed by sources that became available
after the end of the Cold War. Past
espionage cases can be analyzed to determine the prevalence among spies of
behaviors or circumstances often considered indicative of potential
security risk. U.S. Government decisions to approve or disapprove security
clearances for access to classified information are based on a set of
thirteen Adjudicative Guidelines. These guidelines cover behaviors
commonly associated with security risk, such as alcohol and drug abuse,
criminal behavior, emotional or mental problems, financial problems, and
vulnerability to foreign influence. Behavioral
information may be reported in the publicly available sources only if its
presence or absence is particularly noteworthy, or if the case is an
important one that receives in-depth media coverage. As a result,
information on behavioral indicators of potential security risk is
available for only a portion of the cases. Alcohol
Abuse: An offender was
considered to have engaged in "excessive alcohol use" if he/she
was described in one or more open sources as having an alcohol problem,
being a heavy drinker, or having been under the influence at the time of
first contact with a foreign intelligence service. Forty
offenders reportedly used alcohol to excess. This is 27% of all offenders
or 51% of the 79 cases for which information is available about alcohol
use. These are minimum figures. It is quite possible that some of those
for whom no information is available on alcohol use actually had an
alcohol problem. Drug
Abuse: The numbers on
illegal drug use are similar to those for excessive alcohol use.
Information is available for 76 of the 150 cases. Of those cases for which
information is available, 53% of the subjects engaged in illegal drug use
while 47% reportedly did not. The current relevance of such statistics on
drug use is uncertain, as the prevalence of drug use, especially within
the military, has varied greatly over the years. Spending Inconsistent with Known Income Level:
Spies who obtain significant amounts of money may be tempted to spend
their illegal income in ways that attract attention to their unexpected or
unexplained affluence. To examine this subject, one can look at the 64
cases in which payment was received. In 23 of these cases (36%), the
offenders were reported to have demonstrated financial affluence not
consistent with their known income. For the 26 cases in which the spy was
paid $40,000 or more, unexplained affluence was reported in 20 cases
(77%). As usually happens, unfortunately, this information was not known
until after the offender was arrested. Foreign
Interests: The
national guidelines governing adjudication of security clearances require
consideration of any foreign relationships that may make an individual
potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. This
includes foreign attachments such as family ties, other emotional
attachments or obligations to foreign persons, and financial, business, or
professional interests abroad. There is concern that conflicting loyalties
or conflicts of interest can make a person vulnerable to foreign pressure. A large
percentage of offenders had foreign backgrounds or connections. For
example: For
analytical purposes, offenders with foreign relatives, foreign emotional
attachments of various types, and foreign financial, business, or
professional interests are combined as a group called offenders with
foreign interests. This group includes 76 (51%) of the offenders. These
offenders with foreign interests can be compared with offenders who had no
such interests. Those with foreign interests were more likely to have been
recruited directly by a foreign service than those without such background
or connections (41% versus 32%), and less likely to have volunteered their
services to a foreign intelligence service (59% versus 66%). Of the 76
offenders with foreign interests, foreign relatives played a role in
recruiting 26% of them. Offenders
with foreign interests were significantly more likely than other offenders
to have been motivated by ideology (34% versus 10%). Recall that in this
context the term ideology includes a set of beliefs based on common ethnic
or national background. On the other hand, they were less likely
to have been motivated by money (61% versus 78%). It is not
surprising that 51% of espionage offenders have foreign interests. This
does not indicate that Americans with foreign background or connections
are less loyal than other Americans. In considering the security risk
associated with foreign interests, it is important to distinguish between
susceptibility to recruitment and vulnerability to being targeted for
recruitment. Foreign
interests do not make one more susceptible (less loyal), but they do make one more
vulnerable. Americans with foreign interests have valuable language skills
and area knowledge. Because of these skills, they are more likely than
other Americans to be in positions where they have access to classified
information. They are more likely to have contact with foreigners and more
likely to feel comfortable dealing with foreigners. They are also more
likely to be accessible for assessment and to be targeted for recruitment
by foreign intelligence services.
Indicators of
Security Risk
|
INFORMATION
| CONDUCT | THREATS |
TECH VULNERABILITY | ASSISTANCE |
